Fuel and leasable minerals mined in the United States have historically been subject to federal royalties while locatable minerals have not. In recent years there have been multiple attempts to alter this policy and subject locatable minerals to federal royalties as well; most recently the preliminary 2011 Obama budget included a gross royalty on hard-rock mining on public lands. This paper analyzes the issue of imposing such federal royalties from both a legal and economic perspective. From a legal perspective, it is argued that the state of western property rights precludes royalties on currently extant claims so revenues from a royalty would not be realized for many years. From an economic perspective, it is argued that the effect on revenue would be smaller than one might anticipate due to such a royalty crowding out state levies or encouraging vertical disintegration on the part of mining firms to avoid much of the burden of the royalty. University of Nevada, Reno, USA Abstract: In the developing world, kidnapping is relatively common, and a market for kidnap insurance has arisen in response. We provide a model that allows us to analyze how kidnap insurance affects the interaction between the kidnapper and the victim's family when both are self-interested and have complete knowledge. We find that a market for kidnap insurance can be supported because it benefits a risk averse family, as long as the introduction of insurance does not increase the risk of kidnapping too much. Families should fully insure if purchasing insurance does not increase the probability of kidnapping, and partially insure otherwise. Kidnapping insurance allows families to redeem hostages from kidnappers who are more willing to kill, which reduces the number of kidnapping fatalities as long as the insurance does not increase the risk of kidnapping too much. 
Introduction
Social interaction can be unpleasant. Yet the risks which one social interaction can spawn may be remedied by another. A kidnapping is an especially unpleasant social interaction, for both the victim and his or her family. Kidnap insurance has arisen as a response to kidnapping risk. Kidnapping has been explained as a rational behavior by Selten (1977) and Crettez and Deloche (2009) , who depict kidnapping as an equilibrium outcome of a social interaction, a game occurring between a kidnapper and a family. To date, however, kidnapping insurance has not been explained within a context that also explains kidnapping, nor have the implications of kidnapping insurance been explored theoretically in such a context. This paper addresses this gap in the literature.
Kidnappings for ransom are especially common today in developing countries.
For overviews of this problem, see Briggs (2001 Briggs ( , 2002 , Moor and Zumpolle (2001) , Mohamed (2008) , Moor and Remijnse (2008) , and Philips (2009). To illustrate, in Colombia, the reported number of kidnappings in the year 2010 was 282 (Overseas Security Advisory Council 2011:7), a substantial number, though far below the peak of about 3500 reported kidnappings in the year 2000 (Rodriguez and Villa 2012:1148) . In Mexico, contrastingly, the reported number of kidnappings is way up, increasing from roughly 600 in the year 2000 to roughly 2,000 in the year 2010 (Washington Post 2010).
Special Contigency Risks, a London-based kidnap and extortion insurance specialist, reports that Colombia no longer makes the top 10 list of countries with the most kidnappings per capita, but Mexico was on the list, joined by developing countries such as Guatemala, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan (Special Contigency Risks 2010:8) . Because the number of unreported cases is estimated to be multiples higher than the number of reported cases, 3 reported cases significantly underrepresent the kidnapping problem in developing countries.
People respond to the risk of kidnapping in various ways. Reasonable responses include using safer routes when travelling, investing more in home security, and purchasing more private protection services. Evidence also indicates people move away from more risky areas (Rodriguez and Villa 2012) and are less likely to trust strangers (Ochoa 2009 ). Firms respond to additional kidnapping risks by investing less (Pshiva and Suarez 2006) .
For our investigation, most relevant is that fact that people also respond to kidnapping risk by purchasing kidnap and ransom insurance (Briggs 2001:43-44; Clendenin 2006 Clendenin -2007 Flesch 1993 Flesch , 1998 Flesch , 2001 Merkling and Davies 2001; Kenney 2007 Kenney -2008 . Insurance may be purchased by individuals, but obtaining kidnapping insurance through an employer is more common (Kenney 2007 (Kenney -2008 . Standard kidnap and ransom policies cover the ransom payment, the costs associated with resolving the kidnap situation, the money lost during the delivery of the ransom, and the costs of consulting services delivered by kidnapping experts (Kenney 2007 (Kenney -2008 Clendenin 2006 Clendenin -2007 .
The Lloyd's of London syndicate was the first to offer kidnap and ransom insurance, developing this type of coverage after the famous kidnapping and death of Charles Lindbergh Jr. in the U.S. in 1932 (Clendenin 2006 (Clendenin -2007 . Today, the Loyd's of London syndicate Hiscox is the world's largest provider of kidnap and ransom 3 Lechner (2007:26) estimates that only 10% of all kidnappings in the world are reported. For Mexico another estimate is that 25% of all kidnapping cases get reported (The Washington Post 2011).
insurance (Hiscox 2012) , and the market for kidnap and ransom insurance has greatly expanded. In 2005, annual premium payments for kidnap and ransom insurance coverage were estimated at more than $250 million (Clendenin 2006 (Clendenin -2007 and an estimate from 2011 puts the total annual premium payments at $500 million (Apps 2011 ).
Our paper is related to the literature on the political economy of terrorism that deals theoretically and empirically with issues such as the effect of terrorism on the economy, the effect of economic conditions on terrorism, the design of counterterrorism measures, the problem of transnational terrorism, and the negotiation between terrorist groups and the government. For overviews of this literature see, for instance, Enders and Sandler (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) .
Kidnapping situations involving terrorists and governments have especially received attention. Sandler and Scott (1987) empirically analyze the success of terrorists who took hostages and Scott (1991) concludes that governments seek to build a reputation of not being willing to negotiate with terrorists. Atkinson et al. (1987) formulate and test hypotheses which relate the bargaining costs of kidnappers to the size of the ransom demanded. Lapan and Sandler (1988) derive the conditions under which governments are able to commit to a non-negotiation strategy in one-shot and repeated interactions.
Our contribution differs from these contributions in that we do not recognize government as a player, but rather we concentrate on the interaction between the kidnapper and the victim's family. As Scott (1991:210) observes, "individuals and business might value hostage lives more than governments." More significantly, when a government is not involved, extenuating geopolitical concerns will not tend to be involved. In our model, as is typical in kidnappings that do involve a government, the primary goal of the kidnapper is obtaining a ransom payment and the primary benefit to the family of paying the ransom payment is getting the hostage back unharmed.
Our model follows that of Selten (1977) and Crettez and Deloche (2009) by modeling kidnapping as a game between a potential kidnapper and a potential victim family, but we extend the model to include kidnap insurance. As in general models of insurance, we find that the agent facing risk, here the family, must be risk averse in order for insurance to be beneficial. As in the previous Selten and Crettez and Deloche models of kidnapping, we find that the kidnapper must have a willingness to kill the hostage above a particular threshold in order for kidnapping to be rational. When this willingness to kill is high enough, but not too high, kidnapping is rational and a market for kidnapping can form. When the existence of a market for kidnap insurance does not affect the probability of kidnapping, it is optimal for a risk-averse family to fully insure the expected ransom payment. When the existence of a market for kidnap insurance increases the probability of kidnapping, but not too much, it is still best for a family to buy insurance, but the expected ransom payment should only be partially insured.
The model also produces some results that are less intuitive than those just mentioned. First, while risk averse families will benefit from the introduction of kidnap insurance, most kidnappers do not benefit. In particular, no kidnapper who could have been paid a ransom to release a hostage in a world without insurance will benefit by the introduction of insurance. Second, the introduction of kidnap insurance increases the ransom offer the family will be willing to make, allowing the family to redeem the hostage from a kidnapper that is more willing to kill, making possible a decrease in the percentage of kidnappings that result in hostage deaths. This result implies there are some kidnappers who benefit from the introduction of kidnap insurance: Those who would have killed the hostage when insurance was not available to supplement the ransom payment, but who can be paid enough to release the hostage using insurance.
Third, when kidnapping is less likely, kidnap insurance makes a larger difference:
Families benefit more because their insurance purchases more significantly reduce the variation in possible outcomes, kidnappers with a high willingness to kill benefit more because it becomes more likely that accepting the ransom offer is better than the satisfaction obtained from killing the hostage, and hostages benefit more because more are rescued.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a kidnapping game with insurance. Section 3 examines the family's insurance decision. Section 4 derives the equilibrium outcomes of the model when kidnap insurance does not increase the probability that the kidnapper contemplates kidnapping a member of the family. Section 5 derives the outcomes of the model when kidnap insurance does increase the probability that the kidnapper contemplates kidnapping a member of the family. Section 6 concludes.
A Kidnapping Game with Kidnap Insurance
As Selten (1977) Figure 1 . After choosing to kidnap, K chooses the ransom level at choice node K4.
In response, F chooses the ransom offer at choice node F5. Upon receiving the ransom offer, K chooses whether or not to accept the ransom at choice node K6. If K accepts, then chance node C7 is reached, where chance determines whether or not K is caught by the authorities. In this case, the game either ends with K being caught, or with K getting away with the ransom. In the alternative case, where K does not accept the ransom, the choice node K8 is reached, and K chooses whether or not to kill the hostage. Depending upon this choice, chance node C9 or C10 is then reached, where chance determines whether or not the kidnapper is caught by the authorities. Regarding these choices and possibilities, we assume:
A5:
If K kidnaps, the probability of being caught is . This probability is independent of other events and factors. In particular, the probability K is caught is independent of whether or not the hostage is killed.
A6:
The event "K contemplates kidnapping" is independent of the event "K gets caught for kidnapping," so the probability is that these two events both occur. 
A10: K's preferences are such that .
Assumptions A8-A10 warrant discussion. Consistent with both Selten (1977) and Crettez and Deloche (2009) , we assume in A8 that K receives punishment when caught after killing a kidnapped hostage, and that this punishment is greater than the punishment received when caught after not killing the hostage. The payoff assumed in A9, which K receives for killing the hostage, is consistent the Crettez and Deloche's (2009) model. Selten (1977) introduced the payoff quantity to represent the psychological satisfaction K would tend to feel to release the frustration of receiving an offer C that is less than the demand D, We impose assumption A10 because, as will be shown below, A10 must hold in order for K's kill threat to be credible, and not just a bluff. The quantity is the extra cost K expects to incur if the hostage is killed. The quantity can be thought of as K's willingness to kill, independent of the ransom demand and ransom offer. Thus, can be thought of as K's net willingness to kill. K must have a positive net willingness to kill, as assumed in A10, or it would be rational for F to neither buy insurance nor offer any ransom, for K would be worse off killing than not. Because this net willingness to kill quantity appears in many of the calculations below, it is convenient to identify it using a single variable .
Given assumptions A1-A10, (2) kidnap and accept the ransom offer, (3) kidnap, reject the ransom offer and kill the hostage, and (4) kidnap, reject the ransom offer, and not kill the hostage. Table 2 presents the expected utility F would perceive for each of these four possible cases.
<Insert Table 2 About Here>
Using the expected utility expressions in Table 2 , F would rationally develop plans for insurance purchases. Notice F's expected utility strictly decreases with increases in the level of insurance purchased, except for when K kidnaps and accepts F's offer. Thus, F will rationally plan to purchase no insurance, setting , except for the case in which F believes the optimal choice for K is to kidnap, accept F's ransom offer and release the hostage. Thus, we learn, when the family and kidnapper have full information as assumed in our model, an insurance market will only be observed when the optimal choice for the kidnapper is to kidnap, accept the ransom offer and release the hostage.
For this case of interest, purchasing insurance allows F to insure against two hazards. One is the possibility that K contemplates kidnapping, and the other is the possibility K is not caught after a kidnapping ransom is paid. To derive the optimal level of insurance to purchase, F must weigh the benefits of insuring these hazards to a larger degree against the additional cost of the insurance. For now, assume , so the amount of insurance does not impact the probability that K contemplates kidnapping.
(We relax this assumption below.) Under this assumption, the marginal impact of insurance on expected utility is (2) Using (1) to eliminate from (2) and setting , we find the optimal level of insurance must satisfy,
Since is strictly decreasing in the expected payoff , equation (3) can hold only if
. That is, F will choose to fully insure the anticipated ransom offer . By fully insuring, F's expected utility reduces to , and with the competitive insurance premium (1), this expected utility becomes (4) From (4), we learn that, when it is optimal for the family to purchase insurance, the expected utility of the family is increasing the probability that the kidnapper gets caught, decreasing in the probability that the kidnapper contemplates kidnapping, and decreasing in the ransom offer level .
The Equilibrium Outcome
Having full information, K would factor in F's insurance contingency plans when K makes decisions. In particular, when making decisions, K would know the optional choices for would generate expected payoffs for F and K as presented in Table 3 .
<Insert Table 3 About Here>
The equilibrium outcome of the model depends upon which of the four choices presented in Table 3 is best for K. Using backward induction to solve the model, we begin with the choice node K8. The best choice for K will yield the expected payoff for K. This implies, at node K6, the optimal choice for K will yield K the expected payoff . That is, at node K6, K will either accept F's ransom offer, expecting the payoff , or reject the offer expecting .
Knowing K's optimal choices at nodes K6 and K8 depend upon K's payoffs as just described, F would rationally set the offer level at node F5. To begin, note that, if were to hold, then F would recognize K's threat to kill the hostage is a bluff. The situation implies when F chooses . K's expected payoff at node K3 would be for kidnapping and for not kidnapping. Hence, K would choose to not kidnap when F calls K's bluff.
From this analysis, we learn assumption A10 must hold to explain kidnapping. That is, a kidnapper must perceive some positive net benefit from killing, independent of the ransom, for kidnapping to be rational.
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With assumption A10 imposed, F must set to save the hostage. If F sets , then K expects the payoff , either from accepting the zero ransom offer and releasing the hostage or from rejecting the ransom offer and releasing the hostage.
However, rejecting the offer and killing the hostage yields , which by assumption A10 is greater than .
Thus, under assumption A10, K would reject a zero ransom offer and kill the hostage, and F would experience the payoff .
Consistent with the findings of Selten (1977) and Crettez and Deloche (2009), we find K will never rationally reject a positive ransom offer and not kill the hostage. To keep the kidnapper from killing the hostage at node K8, F must set the ransom offer level so , which implies a ransom offer of , or Assumption A10 requires , so we find F must set the ransom offer so that . In particular, for any positive ransom demand , F must set to keep K from killing the hostage at node K8. Rejecting this positive offer an not killing the hostage would yield K the expected payoff , while accepting the offer would yield . Since for all positive ransom offers , we know K will never choose to reject a positive ransom offer and not kill the hostage.
At node K6, the payoffs in Table 3 indicate K will accept a positive ransom offer rather than reject the offer and kill the hostage when or when . F has no reason to offer more than the minimum offer necessary to free the hostage, so F can ensure K will accept the offer and release the hostage by setting (5) F will rationally offer the ransom (5) if and only if F's payoff associated with paying the ransom, which is , is greater than the payoff received by F when the hostage is killed, which is . This implies F's ransom offer must satisfy
Combining conditions (5) and (6), we learn F will make the ransom offer (5) and K will accept it when
We see in condition (6) that the maximum ransom offer F will make depends upon whether or not a market for insurance exists. If there is no insurance market, so , then (6) reduces to . Alternatively, if there is a competitive insurance market as described above, and F makes an optimal insurance purchase, so and , then (6) reduces to . That is, / is the maximum offer K can hope to extract when there is no insurance market, while / is the maximum when there is a competitive insurance market.
We thus find that the existence of a competitive insurance market increases the maximum ransom demand a family is willing to pay. The magnitude of the increase depends upon the probability that kidnapping is contemplated by the kidnapper. If kidnapping were always contemplated by the potential kidnapper, then the existence of insurance would make no difference in the family's willingness to pay. It is the possibility that kidnapping might not be contemplated, even when it would be the best option, that enables a market for insurance to increase the willingness of a family to pay.
The insurance company can pool the premiums collected from cases where kidnapping is not contemplated to pay on cases in which kidnapping is contemplated. Thus, the existence of insurance increases the amount the family is willing to pay by more when kidnapping is less likely contemplated.
It is interesting to note that the availability of insurance makes probability more salient, in terms of increasing the willingness of the family to pay, but the probability does not have a similar impact. Why? Without insurance, the kidnapper is caught percent of the time, and the ransom is returned. The family already factors this into the willingness to pay. Just as the likelihood the kidnapper is caught can subsidize the willingness of the family to pay in a world without insurance, so can the probability the kidnapper will not contemplate kidnapping subsidize the willingness of the family to pay in a world with insurance.
condition (6) holds. By setting near zero, K can ensure the value of set by F using rule (5) will satisfy condition (7). Moreover, as K increases the ransom demand , the ransom offered by F in (5) increases. Thus, K is motivated to increase the ransom demand until condition (7) becomes binding. Four different cases can be identified, since condition (7) may or may not become binding and a market for kidnap insurance may or may not exist.
First, in the absence of an insurance market, where , condition (7) does not become binding as long as (8) Knowing condition (8) and the restriction hold, K is motivated to make the ransom demand arbitrarily large so F is induced to offer the maximum amount .
The expected payoff for K in this case is , while the expected utility for F is .
Second, when a competitive insurance market exists, so and , condition (7) does not become binding as long as (9) Knowing condition (9) holds, K is again motivated to make the ransom demand D infinitely large to induce F to offer the maximum . The expected payoff for K in this case is again , but for F the expected utility is .
Third, if there is no insurance market, K finds it optimal to reject the maximum offer that can be elicited from F and kill the hostage when (10) K can increase the ransom demand to a level where condition (7) becomes binding.
Under condition (10) and , condition (7) Fourth, if there is an insurance market, K will find it optimal to reject the maximum offer that can be elicited from F and kill the hostage when (11) K can increase the ransom demand to a level where condition (7) becomes binding.
Under condition (11) and the conditions and , condition (7) becomes binding at a finite ransom demand level, say . By setting , K induces F to provide the ransom offer . K's payoff would be . Again, if K alternatively sets the ransom demand to induce F to offer , K would receive the payoff . This latter payoff is greater than the former if , which is assumed in (11). Thus, K would kill the hostage in this case and receive , while the expected utility of F in this case would be .
Summarizing, by comparing the case with a competitive insurance market to the case where there is no insurance market, we find:
(1) The introduction of a competitive insurance market allows the family to recover a hostage from a kidnapper with a greater net willingness to kill. Without an insurance market, the hostage will be killed if the kidnapper has a net willingness to kill equal to , while with a competitive insurance market the hostage will be killed when .
(2) The introduction of a competitive insurance market does not change the kidnapper's expected payoff. The kidnapper's expected payoff is , with insurance available or without insurance available.
However, there are kidnappers who benefit from addition of insurance.
By allowing a higher ransom payment, insurance would increase the well-being of those kidnappers who would have killed the hostage if no insurance were available but who with insurance can be provided a ransom offer that exceeds the value to the kidnapper of killing the hostage.
(3) The fraction of kidnappings with a fatal ending is lower in the presence of a market for kidnap insurance. Therefore, if kidnap insurance has no effect on the probability of kidnapping, as assumed so far, the introduction of kidnap insurance would reduce the number fatal kidnappings. Figure 2 illustrates how purchasing insurance increases the utility of the family. When there is no insurance, for the case of interest, the family faces a lottery. With will pay the ransom offer and with the family will incur no loss. So, the expected outcome is + , as shown. The risk aversion implied by the concavity of the utility function ensures that the family will be better off incurring the certain insurance loss of , which yields the higher level of utility , as shown.
<Insert Figure 2 About Here>
When Kidnap Insurance Increases the Probability of Kidnapping
The provision of kidnap insurance might have an effect on the probability that kidnappings are contemplated. A potential kidnapper might hear about a successful exchange of a victim for ransom that may have been facilitated with the aid of an insurance agency, or a potential kidnapper might conclude from the presence of a kidnap insurance market that his potential victims are on average willing to pay more ransom compared to the situation when no kidnap insurance market exists. These are just two of many potential channels through which kidnap insurance might have a positive effect on the probability that a potential kidnapper contemplates kidnapping.
Governments have acted to place restrictions on kidnap insurance because of the belief that kidnap insurance may increase the number of kidnappings. In 1991, the Italian government passed an act restricting the use of insurance to deal with the risk of being kidnapped (Detotto et al. 2012:12; Moor and Remijnse 2008:50) , seeking to make kidnapping less attractive. In the 1980s, the British government under Margaret Thatcher was concerned about the effect of kidnap insurance on the number of kidnappings (Auerbach 1998:214-215) . Instead of outlawing kidnap insurance, an informal agreement was reached to include the Criminal Acts Inclusion Clause in every kidnap insurance policy (Briggs 2001:42-43 ). This clause gave government the option of declaring ransom payments illegal, and made it illegal for underwriters to pay kidnap victims (Briggs 2001:43) . As kidnappings surged in the early 1990s, Columbia in 1993 declared kidnap insurance contracts to be null and void and criminalized the participation in kidnap insurance contracts (Clandenin 2006 (Clandenin -2007 Moor and Remijnse 2008:41) .
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To capture the idea that kidnap insurance may increase the probability that kidnapping is contemplated, assume . Also, to be able to derive results, assume families and potential kidnappers have full knowledge of this impact of insurance on the likelihood of kidnapping. Finally, also assume the family fully recognizes how the insurance market is impacted, perceiving how the insurance premium depends upon the insurance level, so the family perceives when the insurance market is in equilibrium. Under these assumptions, the expected utility of the family, as a function of the level of insurance, is If the family were to fully insure, so , then would hold, and condition (13) would reduce to . This negative marginal utility indicates fully insuring is not optimal, as it was in the previous case. In this case, F can increase its expected utility by reducing the insurance coverage from full coverage, choosing some level .
If F purchases no insurance, condition (13) reduces to . This condition must be positive in order for the purchase of some insurance to increase utility. Whether or not this condition is positive depends upon the size of . If is large enough, this condition is negative. Thus, we learn that an insurance market will fail to arise if opening an insurance market sufficiently raises the probability kidnapping is contemplated. Alternatively, if is close enough to zero, this marginal utility of insurance is positive, and purchasing at least some insurance will be beneficial.
Assume is close enough to zero that an insurance market will arise. With , we know , so and in condition (13). This implies the first two terms in condition (13) are negative. Consequently, in order for an increase in the insurance level from zero to higher values requires that the third term in condition (13) be positive and outweigh the two negative terms. As increases and converges to , and converge to the same value, so that the third term cannot outweigh the first two. Thus, when an insurance market can arise, we know there is some level of insurance that is optimal between 0 and Let this optimal level of insurance be denoted .
F finds it worthwhile to make the ransom offer (5) as long as condition (6) holds.
Let denote the family's contribution to the ransom offer, and use this definition to replace in condition (6). Condition (6) then reduces to . As F moves from full insurance to less than full insurance, F's contribution increases from zero, and the right side of this last condition decreases, which is a reduction in the maximum ransom offer F is willing to make.
F's maximum ransom offer is when F can buy insurance, but when F cannot buy insurance. Consequently, the ability to purchase insurance increases F's maximum ransom offer as long as , which is equivalent to
. That is, we learn the introduction of insurance increases F's maximum ransom offer as long as the expected contribution of the family to the ransom offer does not exceed the value of the hostage to the family.
If a competitive insurance market exists, so and , condition (6) will not become binding as long as (14) Knowing condition (14) holds, K is motivated to make the ransom demand D infinitely large to induce F to offer the maximum . The expected payoff for K in this case is again , but for F the expected utility is
(1
In the previous case, where for all , we know , so (15) reduces to . Because and , we know the expected utility given in (15), where , is less than the expected utility of the family when . That is, the family's expected utility decreases when buying insurance increases the likelihood kidnapping is contemplated. Figure 3 shows how insurance impacts the expected utility of the family, both for the case where insurance increases the probability kidnapping is contemplated and for the case where it does not. If there is no insurance available, then the family expects the utility level + , where . This is less than the utility expected when insurance is available. It is the risk aversion of the family that allows insurance to increase the utility of the family.
When insurance increases the probability kidnapping is contemplated, the ransom paid is still . If the family were to fully insure, it would be located at point M in Figure 3 , and its utility would be . Because , when , we know . That is, the utility obtained by fully insuring is decreased by the fact that buying insurance increases the likelihood of kidnapping.
There are advantages to the family of reducing insurance coverage from full coverage, but there is also a disadvantage. One advantage is the probability of kidnapping falls. A second advantage is the insurance premium decreases. The disadvantage is the family moves from experiencing the sure loss of the insurance premium to experiencing a lottery. This lottery, which is associated with the family paying a portion of the ransom out of pocket, is shown in Figure 3 . With probability , no kidnapping occurs, and the family experiences only the loss of the insurance premium, which is the loss . Alternatively, with probability the family loses both the insurance premium and the out of pocket ransom payment , which is the loss .
As the family moves from full insurance coverage to less insurance, the family moves from the certainty of obtaining the outcome represented by point M in Figure 3 to experiencing the lottery described by the line segment KL. When the family purchases no insurance, , and the line segment KL in Figure 3 would shift and become equivalent to the second line segment shown in Figure 3 , which represents the lottery faced by the family without insurance. If purchasing insurance can enhance the utility of the family, then there exists a point like point H in Figure 3 , where the expected utility of the family exceeds the utility obtained from either full insurance coverage or no insurance coverage. The expected utility experienced by the family in this case is .
The potential benefits for the family of having access to an insurance market are thus smaller when the amount of insurance purchased increases the probability that kidnapping is contemplated, but the family still stands to benefit from the availability of insurance. However, as was true for the case where insurance did not impact the probability of kidnapping, some hostages are freed from their kidnappers because families offer higher ransom payments. This pushes the offers above the net willingness to kill of the marginal kidnapper, reducing the fraction of fatal kidnappings. Whether the overall number of fatal kidnappings increases or decreases because of the presence of a market for kidnap insurance depends on which is stronger, the effect insurance has on increasing the probability that kidnapping is contemplated or the effect insurance has on reducing the fraction of kidnappings that result in fatalities.
Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical investigation leads us to three main conclusions about how kidnapping insurance may affect the parties potentially involved in kidnapping incidents.
First, if the addition of insurance does not increase the probability of kidnapping too much and if families are risk averse, a market for kidnapping insurance has room to form. In our model, randomness determines whether or not a family may experience kidnapping, and insurance allows the instances when kidnapping does not occur to finance the instances when it occurs. The expected utility of the risk averse family increases because the kidnapping insurance reduces the uncertainty associated with the expected loss. In the case where the existence of insurance does not affect the probability of kidnapping, the optimal insurance coverage is full coverage, and uncertainty is entirely eliminated.
Second, when the existence of insurance increases the probability of kidnapping, it is not optimal for the family to fully insure. Rather, it is optimal for the family to accept some risk and pay a portion of the ransom out of pocket, with insurance covering the rest. Reducing insurance coverage makes kidnapping less likely and reduces the insurance premium paid, so the burden of accepting less than full coverage is worth bearing. The insurance market becomes unsustainable when the presence of insurance increases the probability of kidnapping so much that the utility maximizing out of pocket expense is greater than the value of the hostage to the family.
Third, an insurance market enables the family to rescue a hostage from a kidnapper with a higher willingness to kill, but may also increase the likelihood of kidnapping. This implies the impact of the introduction of kidnapping insurance on the number of kidnapping deaths is indeterminate. An insurance market allows families to subsidize kidnapping instances with the premiums paid when randomness does not select the family for kidnapping. If kidnapping is rare enough, then a small premium can support a very large ransom payment. This implies kidnappers who would have killed can be moved to not kill with a higher ransom payment. As long as the introduction of the insurance does not increase the probability of kidnapping too much, kidnapping insurance will therefore reduce the number of hostage deaths.
For policy aimed at minimizing the number of fatalities from kidnappings, our results point to the need to carefully consider the tradeoff that kidnap insurance almost surely creates. Yes, kidnap insurance is likely to promote an increase in the likelihood of kidnapping. However, this negative impact of kidnapping insurance can be mitigated by the fact that kidnapping insurance allows a hostage to be redeemed from kidnappers with a higher willingness to kill. If kidnap insurance does not increase the probability of kidnapping too much, then an unintended consequence of a law banning kidnap insurance would be an increase in the number of kidnapping deaths as the law reduces the ability of families to pay the larger ransoms necessary to successfully redeem family members. 
Appendix: Derivation of the Marginal Utility of Insurance

